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Introduction
The European Union (EU) has taken major steps forward, in cementing its relations with the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, by instigating multilateral arrangements for reciprocal preferential 
treatment, under the Lome Convention. These ties of international cooperation are however not new, and 
date back to the post-Independence era, when Europe was in search of adequate means of maintaining its 
relations with former colonies, and participate in their development processes. Thus, in the early Seventies, 
the Lome Convention was conceived, as a binding instrument   in promoting trade relations, which 
would be mutually beneficial to all Parties concerned.  Beneficiary countries of the Lome Convention, 
would maintain existing privileges, but in return, would accord the same preferential treatment to their 
EU partners. Such commitment to reciprocity in trade-related policies, and exchanges, constitute an 
essential component of the anticipated Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA), which could pave the way to the creation of a Free Trade Zone (FTZ), in association with the EU 
countries, at a later date.   
The principle of reciprocity itself, raises important questions, as the removal of customs duties on imports 
from Europe, could have serious repercussions on national economies in Africa.. A fall in revenues, on 
customs’ levies, would induce an increase in European imports, but to the detriment of the local producers 
as well as to those exporters from non-European countries. Furthermore, this reduction of customs 
tariffs, could trigger-off significant shortfalls in public revenues, and consequently, in public expenditure, 
bearing in mind that this could also mean lower prices of European consumer goods, available on African 
markets, translated into improved welfare in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
The purpose of this study, is to evaluate possible economic repercussions of the trade facet, in Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs), currently being negotiated between countries of the Common Market 
in Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and Member-States of European Union (EU). In so-doing, 
we have used two complementary models, the first one, based-on a general equilibrium approach, and 
the second, a partial equilibrium method. Indeed, multilateral trade agreements, will have implications 
trade activities, on the production of goods and factors, the price of consumer-goods, on the are of 
specialization of national economies, and their productive structure. Existing trade policy instruments 
also, will have direct and indirect effects on the market value of goods produced locally, or imported onto 
the markets of the COMESA sub-region.
In order to reflect these interactions in various economic sectors, a general equilibrium method was used, 
for a clearer overall picture of possible  consequences of EPAs, in the COMESA countries, as well as any 
modification in trade policies, would entail for their respective economic structure  under this type of 
partnership agreement. 
2However, the majority of the African countries are not individually present in the databases, associated 
with the above-mentioned models, preferring to visit  aggregated sets, as the case may be in most of the 
COMESA countries. By applying the WITS-SMART formula however, it is possible to complete the 
general equilibrium analysis, using a database that does not interfere with national specificities. 
The study under review, has four parts, which are as follows: The first, highlights major challenges in 
negotiating EPAs, are presented on the COMESA sub-region (1), followed by a systematic approach to 
the evaluation of various economic repercussions, these agreements might have in the COMESA sub 
region (2), then, moving onto simulations of the general equilibrium approach (3) and, the results of 
partial equilibrium scenarios (4) . 
I.  Challenges in negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) 
1.1 Issues at stake in making the transition from the Lome Convention 
Considering that multilateral cooperation, between Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), date 
back to the pre-Independence colonial era, when and that Europe was desirous of maintaining and 
strengthening its relations with its former colonies, once they had acceded to full Autonomy, by 
involving themselves in its economic development processes, a major step forward was taken in the 
early Seventies, when Europe decided to create an innovative framework of multilateral cooperation 
agreements, known as the  Lome Convention. At the time, this was a great achievement in international 
relations, particularly because of the support it was offering African countries,   in diversifying their 
economies, and stabilizing World Market prices of raw materials .
The Lome Convention comprises a number of principles, relating to North-South multilateral cooperation, 
as follows: 
•	 The right of each State to determine its political, social, cultural and economic choices; 
•	 The need for ACP countries to define autonomous and self-centred development policies; 
•	 Agricultural development to ensure the food independence of ACP countries; 
•	 Industrialization, which should play a key role in development policies; 
•	 The need for diversifying the production of these countries and for abandoning their excessive 
specialization; 
•	 The development of cooperation and trade between them.
Despite the diversity of tools advocated, the Lome Convention was not  effective in trade creation among 
ACP countries, or in stabilizing the prices of raw-materials, on the World Market. Furthermore, this 
Convention was ineffective in preventing gradual deterioration of trade links between the ACP-countries, 
and the permanence of agro-based specialized export economic structures. In spite of all indications to 
the contrary, clearly stipulated provisions in the Lome Convention, the ACP countries did not call into 
question, the economic soundness, of specialized agricultural export production, opting to continue 
operating, as Europe’s providers of basic commodities. Moreover, these ACP countries, did not put into 
place, strong and competitive economic dynamics, for sustained development, and mutually beneficial 
trade links with Europe. 
Against this background of ineffectiveness of that Instrument, signed in Lome, in the early Seventies, 
Europe began negotiating, a new framework for multilateral cooperation with the ACP countries, and in 
1997, drafted a “green paper” entitled "The relationships between the EU and ACP countries, at the dawn 
1  H. Ben Hammouda, Africa: For a new development contract, Edition Harmatan, 2000.
of the 21st century”2. This formal statement, took two major issues into account: First, the phenomenon 
of globalization, and second, the need for all future agreements, to be integrated into this new reality.. 
In fact, the European Commission (EC), had already underscored this last point by declaring, that “the 
extension of World market-economy, and the end of an era of exclusive rights, and privileged relations, 
had modified the global conditions of demand and supply worldwide”. Trade negotiations, known as 
the “Uruguay Round”, has paved the way for a new global compact, based on stronger bilateral and 
multilateral relations, accelerating the processes of globalization, in this World of growing economic 
interdependence. Economic concerns are more glaring than ever, and have spread beyond social, political 
and  financial boundaries, to  the realm of Mankind and his environment.3
Europe’s intension was manifested, in its designs to integrate this new agreement, into the framework 
of an increasingly Globalized World, at the onset of the 21st Century. Thus, preliminary negotiations, 
spearheaded by the EU, had led to the creation of a new cooperation framework agreement between 
themselves and the ACP countries, duly signed, in the Republic of Benin, in June 2000,and known as 
the “Cotonou Agreement”. 
The main objectives of the Cotonou Agreement were to restore macro-economic balances, develop the 
private sector, improve social services, support regional integration, promote gender equality, protect 
the environment and progressively eliminate all trade barriers between ACP  Members and the EU, on 
a reciprocal basis. This Agreement, which entered into force on 1st. April 2003, has a lifespan of twenty 
years, with scheduled revisions every five years. Its mission relies on five interdependent pillars: Policy 
dialogue, trade promotion and financial cooperation,, the involvement of civil society,  the fight against 
poverty and the compliance with the World Trade Organization (WTO) With regards to this last pillar, 
Signatories of the Cotonou Agreement, agreed to abide by  the rules and regulations of  WTO. There 
are however, only some guidelines, on the procedures to be followed, in so-doing, even though there 
provisions for the continuation of the non-reciprocal treatment, outlined in the Lome Convention, up-
until early 2008, latest. Under the terms of this Agreement, after this deadline, all trade arrangements, 
shall have to be   compatible with the rules and regulations of WTO, and all of its Members, who 
had signed the Cotonou Agreement, further endorsed its stipulations in September 2003, during the 
ministerial conference, referred-to as “The Doha Round”, in September 2003.   
One of the guiding principles of the WTO rules and regulations - the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
treatment – calls for trade concessions, granted by one of its Member to another, to be extended 
automatically to all other Members of WTO. There are two exceptions to this clause however: The first, 
being the dispensation from this clause, on the basis of development priorities, of concern to one of its 
2  European Commission “ green paper” : The relations between the European Union and ACP countries at the dawn of the 21st century, 
Challenges and options for a new partnership- Brussels, 1997
3  European Commission, op cit, p.I.
Members, and the second, which exonerates WTO Members, from the MFN clause, whenever there is a 
Free Trade Zone (FTZ),  between several  of them. 
As noted in the introduction of this study, the first exception calls for  compliance with  the principle of 
non-discrimination only between Members, at the same level of development. Therefore, with regards to a 
Free Trade Zone (FTZ) between WTO Members, as indicated in Article XXIV of the General Agreement 
on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), would create the conditions under which, Members of the COMESA sub-
region, would be exonerated from the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause, whenever such exemption 
is based-on existing free trade agreements benefit, not only the contracting Parties, but enhances the 
overall economic situation in that region, through trade creation, which results in an increase in general 
welfare. Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), between the COMESA countries and the European 
Union (EU), would fall under this category, should they be based- on reciprocity,  preferential treatment 
on tariffs, applied symmetrically. 
Nevertheless, ACP countries might want to look into possibilities, of maintaining some degree of 
asymmetry in their future EPAs with the EU, as the provisions of Article XXIV of GATT, are somewhat 
ambiguous on the point of “symmetrical reciprocity”. In paragraph 8(b) of said Article, it is stated, 
that customs duties would be phased-out, by the time of full reciprocity (2008), and that all other 
restrictive regulations on trade activities, be dismantled for “most of the trade” between members. The 
exact meaning of “most of the trade”, has been debated at length, and  it is generally believed to refer to a 
minimum of 90 % of domestic trade, which  must be liberalized by the end of a free-trade arrangement 
respectively. This interpretation however, has not been confirmed on any legal basis, so far. The free-trade 
agreement between South Africa and the European Union (EU) for example, translated Article XXIV, 
in a non-reciprocal terms, and by the expiration of their free-trade agreement, the EU had consented to 
liberalize 95% of its trade with South Africa, whilst South Africa had consented to liberalize 86% “only”, 
of its imports from Europe. 
Furthermore, with reference to “a reasonable period of time for implementation”, the provisions of 
Article XXIV are not specific, with regards to this time-frame. Once again, there is no legal basis for 
formal interpretation of what should be considered as “reasonable period of time”, although it is believed 
to be a 10-year duration. In the example of the free trade agreement above-mentioned, South Africa had 
proposed a 12-year implementation plan as acceptable, which is longer than that of the EU. Therefore, 
this ambiguity could serve as a tool, in introducing some degree of asymmetry in EPA’ s.  
The time-frames of implementation are crucial to the COMESA countries, and whenever negotiating 
these EPAs, one should bear in mind that this duration limits the time-frame allotted the COMESA 
countries for internal structural adjustments, with regards to market liberalization.. However, as we shall 
see later in the results of various simulations of case scenarios, African countries will not be able to take 
advantage of EPAs unless:
6• Full reciprocity is preceded by intensified regional integration;  
• Time limits for implementation are sufficiently long, to carry-out  required internal adjustments and 
absorb the costs of same; as  intrinsic to trade liberalization. 
Finally, an essential tool in multilateral trade for African countries (and also for other developing 
countries), is the “Doha Declaration”, which prescribes in its paragraph-29, that efforts should be made 
to clarify the provisions of GATT’s Article XXIV, as well as the interpretation of “special and differentiated 
treatment in all regional trade agreements”. These points of WTO negotiations, could become crucial 
in determining the framework of future  EPAs, as well as the degree of flexibility in their terms, so as to 
benefit African countries. The greater the margin of flexibility, the more latitude will be afforded them, 
in rekindling the innovative spirit, born in Lome. 
1.2 What prospects await the COMESA sub-region? 
The COMESA sub-region is, like elsewhere in Africa, characterized by significant marginalization in 
global markets, by low intra-regional trade levels and balances, and by deficient domestic economic 
structures.4  Can EPAs make a difference and change these trends? 
Since 1970, COMESA’s total share of World exports, have fallen from 1.3% to 0.4%.
     Figure 1: Structure of exports (USD Millions)
Source:  Handbook Statistics of the UNCTAD (2004). 
4  See Hakim Ben Hammouda,  Pourquoi l’Afrique s’est-elle marginalisée dans le commerce international?, Center Africain pour les politiques 
commerciales, Working Paper, number 20. (Why has Africa been marginalized in international Trade?, African Trade Policies Centre).
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In spite of efforts made to intensify regional integration, of the COMESA countries, most of its trade 
activities, still take place with non-African countries. Trade liberalization in that sub-region, has not 
changed this trend, and existing trade dynamics, derive mostly from exchanges, with the EU and Asian 
countries, and with other developed Nations. Even between Members and non-members of COMESA, 
there no signs of significant changes in trade relations. Since the early Nineties, trade has grown 
disproportionally, between the two groups, in Sub-Saharan Africa.
At this time , Asian countries seem to be the privileged partners of the COMESA countries, and could 
soon become their principal trading partners, to the detriment of the European Union (EU) Members. 
Statistical data indicate that, between 1990 and 2003, the market share of Asia,5  in the sub-region, 
moved from 17% to 27%, while that of Europe dropped from 46% to33%.
         Figure 2: Trade partners of the COMESA countries 
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COMESA has a trade balance shortfall, as compared to both, the developed countries and the rest of 
African States. The growth of imports, originating in Asian countries, has been particularly fast, at an 
average annual rate of 8.6% between 1990 and 2003, which has led to the downturn of bilateral trade 
balances between COMESA and Asia. This bilateral trade deficit, amounted to USD 5,632 million as at 
the end of 2003, which is almost equal to the trade deficit between COMESA and the EU (USD 5,703 
million), and accounted for 35% of the total trade deficit of the COMESA countries.  
5  Measured through the total exports and imports of this region with COMESA over the total exports and imports of COMESA.
Figure 3: Trade balances  (USD  millions)
Source: Statistics Handbook of UNCTAD, 2004. 
The results of the ratio-coverage analysis, confirm this assumption, in terms of the imports to exports 
coverage, by region. Evidently, the trade balance is in favour of the Asian exports, to the COMESA 
countries, than it is with those from EU countries, or from other developed nations. It should be 
emphasized that trade with the rest of Africa, is also unbalanced. Unlike trade with Asia or the EU, 
which tends to rebalance itself since 1990, intra-African trade is becoming increasingly unfavourable to 
COMESA.  
Table 1: Rate of bilateral coverage (total exports over total imports by region)  
Year European Union Africa Asia Rest of the world TOTAL 
990 % % 6% 6% % 
99 66% % 2% 6% 9% 
2000 6% 2% % 6% 6% 
200 6% % % 90% 66% 
 Source:  UNCTAD, Statistical Handbook, 2004. 
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9II.  General approach to trade analysis
2.1 Why use a general equilibrium model? 
Trade policy-analysis, involves reviewing possible implications, on the productive structure of various 
economies, at national, regional and global levels. Trade policy instruments, such as tariffs or quotas, 
have direct and indirect effects on the relative costs, of goods produced in a given country. Given that 
the factors of national production, in terms of goods and services, may  vary, the demand factors of 
production, shall also vary. Consequently, in a given economy, it is difficult to assess the effects of any 
modification in  trade policies, might have in a given sector. Because various sectoral interactions and 
the relative strength in an economy, there will always be  some effect from any change, affecting the 
production level of a sector. This, by extension, affects the relative structure of various production factors, 
in various sectors. 
This modification in the volume of sectoral production, may at the national and international level of 
trade, be extended to the overall economy. Changes in the relative cost-factors of production, may be 
induced by a modification of trade policy instruments of that country, and transmitted to the industrial 
sector, as well as to markets, with which this country has trade links. Consequently, for trade policy 
analysis to be relevant, and for the results to be sound, it is advisable to take into account those sectoral 
interactions, which could result from a trade policy modification, in one or several countries. The general 
equilibrium approach, offers an analytical framework, that makes it possible to take into account intra-
sectoral changes in production, and by extension, variations demand for various factors of production.
This method has limits however, particularly with regards to taking into account, the dynamic effects 
induced by a change in the trade policy. The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model, is the most 
commonly used method for such analysis. The GTAP method, is a multi-regional computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model, designed for comparative statistical analysis of trade policy issues (Adams et 
al. - 1997). Besides, it is now possible to evaluate trade dynamics, using different versions of this model. It 
has the advantage of overcoming the effects of policy changes, at national, bilateral or multilateral levels, 
on production levels, input factors, volumes of trade and other induced influences on welfare. Given 
that the GTAP model is centered on the reallocation of resources between the sectors of the economy, it 
is an appropriate instrument for identifying the sectors and countries which gain or which lose with the 
change of policy induced by the trade section of the EPA. 
2.2 Why use a partial equilibrium model? 
The general equilibrium model, is an important methodological tool, in evaluating the impact of trade-
related issues, because it can be applied, not only to calculate the direct effects of modifications, derived 
from various simulations, but also the indirect /secondary effects, which include industrial interactions 
0
and macro-economic adjustments. However, the majority of African countries are not individually 
present in the databases of such global models due to the lack of disaggregated data in these countries. 
Hence, the use of a partial equilibrium model, which is an alternative solution for those countries, that 
are not individually present in the general equilibrium  base.  
The main distinction, that should be noted from the onset, is that in a partial equilibrium model, the 
intersectoral implications (secondary effects) in any policy change, will not taken into account in this 
method. The same goes for interregional implications, that might occur within the regional  Community. 
With partial equilibrium models, it is possible to analyze the effects of trade policies in trade creation and 
diversion, on welfare and even on revenues. 
In spite of its imperfections, the partial equilibrium method, is an adequate tool to address the principle 
of special and differentiated treatment (S&D) in a detailed analysis of trade data6. Thus, our simulations 
derive from this partial equilibrium method, and by applying the WITS-SMART7 formula, we have 
obtained more detailed information, and applied the general equilibrium model, such as the GTAP, for 
the assessment of trade creation and diversion, on a country-by -country basis.  
6  On this point, see Milner et al. (2002).
7  See a description of the model used in the annex   
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III. General equilibrium analysis 
In this section, we present the results of general equilibrium simulations for the whole of sub-Saharan 
Africa. Several scenarios are presented. Each one relates to a possible option of EPA negotiations.
3.1 The reference scenario 
The Cotonou agreement indicates that EPAs should come into effect on January 1st. 2008. Various 
international agreements, will have been implemented, prior to this date, with all indications of 
constituting, important landmarks in the economic landscape. Global events, that are expected to precede 
the signing of EPAs are: The extension of the EU- membership to twenty-five countries; the dismantling 
of trade quotas for textiles and clothing; the implementation of the “Uruguay Round” Agreement on 
Domestic Support and Export Subsidies; the complete accession of China to WTO and the conclusion 
of the Doha Round trade negotiations. 
Presently, one cannot anticipate the outcome of the Doha Round of trade negotiations, nor their impact 
on the EPAs. Consequently, we have not integrated them into the reference scenario. On the other hand, 
we will take into account four other important developments, which are as follows: 
The Extension of the EU-membership: Harmonized and integrated trade policies will be put in place by 
the EU, before the EPAs are expected to into force. In taking this fact into account, we have removed all 
tariffs and export subsidies, as well as non-tariff barriers between EU-15 and the ten new members. We 
have also eliminated all trade barriers between the ten new members of the EU. Finally, all the sectors 
of the new members, were given the same level of protectionism, with regards to the rest of the world 
(ROM), as that of EU-15 at the time of their accession. This means that some of the tariffs levied by the 
new EU-members, would have increased, or would have been reduced, to the level of those previously 
charged by the old EU-members.
Cancellation of quotas, under the terms of the “Multifibre” Agreement, and establishment of a new 
Textile-Clothing Agreement: It is expected that the phasing-out of the “Multifibre” Agreement on textiles 
and clothing, will have significant implications for developing countries. It was therefore important for 
this to be taken into account. As in other studies on the subject-matter, this cancellation of textiles and 
clothing quotas, has been taken into account, by  eliminating the equivalent export-duty, particularly in 
the developed countries.  
Implementation of the “Uruguay Round” Terms of Trade: By tradition, the EU is a large consumer of 
export subsidies, and grants for domestic production, particularly in the area of agriculture. While the 
“Doha Round” is expected to pave the way for an agreement, that will have some effects on these two 
pillars, used in the reference scenario, a 20 % reduction on domestic support in the developed countries, 
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has been applied, and 13% in the developing countries. In the case of export subsidies for agriculture, the 
reductions are respectively 36% and 24% for developed and developing countries. 
Accession of China to the WTO: The complete accession of China to WTO should have major 
consequences both on developed countries and on developing countries. Upon acceding to the EU as full 
members, these new members will have to impose, the WTO Most Favoured Nation’s (MFN) tariffs, on 
Chinese products. This was taken into account, in the reference scenario by reducing tariffs on Chinese 
products, to the level of MFN tariffs, as applied by the members of WTO8. 
3.2 Possible Scenarios for the Economic Partnership Agreements between the 
European Union and Sub-Saharan Africa 
In this study, we attempted to assess the impacts of EPAs in the following three scenarios. 
Scenario 1 – Reciprocity on preferential tariffs between Sub-Saharan Africa and the European 
Union:  Reciprocity is one of the guiding principles in EPAs. This scenario assesses the implications of the 
EPAs in the case of Sub-Saharan African countries, which would apply the same preferential treatment 
to the European Union, as that from which they currently benefit from. 
The question of full reciprocity in the framework of EPAs, readily comes to mind. The European Union 
generally applies low tariffs on imports from Sub-on Sub-Saharan Africa. Consequently, all the tariffs 
reported for that Zone, are higher than those applied in the European Union for African products, and 
gradually to that level to reflect full reciprocity. The general idea is that, EPAs will be concluded primarily 
to establish an economic association, which would be compatible with the WTO framework, and not 
necessarily aimed-at the future creation of a free-trade zone, which implies full trade liberalization10.
Conversely, in sectors such as the food- processing industry, and agricultural production of cereals and 
sugar, livestock farming and fish products, expected tariffs applied in Sub-Saharan Africa, would be 
increased to the level of those in the European Union. However, we did not take that approach not 
8  On the basis of tariffs, currently applied on goods originating in China, the following sectors are expected to be of great relevance, to the 
accession of China to WTO:  
-  Animal products, clothing, low and average technology industrial products, in the case of sub-Saharan Africa; 
-  Cereals and low-technology industrial products, in the case of the  rest of the world;  
-  Cereals, other natural resources and average technology industrial products, in  the case of North America; 
-  Other natural resources, low and average technology industrial products, in the case of Japan; low and average technology industrial products, 
in the case of the expanded European Union (EU-25). 
9  Because of aggregations of various products and regions, the majority of customs’ tariffs, which the European Union levies on imports, 
originating in Sub-Saharan Africa, is higher than zero. Preferential tariffs,  do not necessarily imply the duty-free access. The Lome Convention 
calls for 95% duty-free access to products under the headings, of ACP countries. However, non-tariff barriers  have accumulated over time, and 
their equivalent values have been  taken into account, whenever compiling  GTAP databases.
10  A free-trade zone between the European Union and sub-Saharan Africa is presented as an alternative scenario if the negotiations would 
thereafter aim at the establishment of an FTZ rather than what is currently perceived as the objective.
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in this scenario, for two reasons: First, in the case of the food- processing industry, there already exist 
relevant Protocols on beef and sugar, which are very specific, and had to be taken into account, when 
compiling the EU aggregations. The second reason, is that the EU tariffs are higher than those of Sub-
Saharan Africa’ because of various peaks in production, and tariff escalation, which must be negotiated as 
special particular elements of EPAs.  Protocols, peak production and tariff escalation, will most likely, be 
discussed during the negotiations of EPAs, but not necessarily as elements of full reciprocity. By basing 
ourselves on the graphs and tables below, we believe that reciprocity should play an important role, in 
industrial sectors, such as textiles and clothing, and in most of the of primary production sectors. 
Scenario 2  –Intensifying regional integration without reciprocity:  The Cotonou Agreement calls for 
the intensification of intra-regional cooperation and integration among ACP-countries. In this scenario, 
the principle of intensified regional integration in Africa, is taken into account. The reasoning that 
underlies this second scenario is that, because most African countries were unable to take advantage of the 
preferential tariffs, within the framework of Lome, was mainly due to constraints related to their market 
supply capacity. Evidently, these countries will need to develop this capacity. This scenario presents an 
option, in which the Sub-Saharan African countries accept to liberalize trade between them, without 
immediate reciprocity, but by replicating the tariff preferential treatment, they are presently granted by 
the European Union, which would enable them to compete with European producers and exporters. 
Scenario 3  – Establishment of a Free Trade Zone between Sub-Saharan Africa and the European 
Union:  Scenarios 1 and 2 did not take into consideration, that EPAs would lead to the establishment 
of a Free Trade Zone (FTZ). Thus, in order for Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, to be compatible 
with the WTO rules and regulations, these countries would have to undertake some economic reforms 
and structural adjustments, to apply the preferential treatment, they are currently receiving from the 
European Union (EU). In these scenarios, the EU does not have to make any adjustments, in view of 
existing Protocols on certain products, and non-tariff barriers. The objective of the second scenario was 
to provide a space in the analysis, for production capacity development in the countries of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, before reciprocity. In the third scenario, we explore the option of establishing a FTZ between Sub-
Saharan Africa and the European Union. In this scenario, therefore, all bilateral trade barriers, between 
the SSA and EU countries, are eliminated. 
3.3 Results from scenario-simulations 
Macroeconomic variable in, trade and welfare: The  compound- effects 
Detailed results of these three scenarios, are presented in Table-10, in annex to this study.
S1- The results indicate, that within the framework of full reciprocity, the effects on the volume of the 
gross domestic product (GDP), are negative for all regions other than the European Union (Figure-4). 
Revenues in sub-Saharan Africa, decline marginally, and the consequences of reciprocity there,  more 
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significant, in terms of trade and general welfare (calculated by the equivalent percentage of the variation). 
Imports into the Sub-Saharan African countries, increase more steadily, than their exports and, together 
with the progressive deterioration in relations, trade balances decrease by USD 1,868 million. Besides the 
marginal effects on the GDP, and the overall shortfall in trade balance, resulted in gradual deterioration 
of general welfare, whenever full reciprocity is implemented in the SSA-region. 
S2- Trade barriers among African countries, obviously limit the economic potential, and the possibility 
of improving general welfare. By overlooking tariff and non-tariff obstacles in scenario-2, revenue 
potential increases, and there is noticeable improvement in general welfare. As depicted in Figures-4 
and 5, if African countries, agree to liberalize their markets, within the framework of EPAs, but without 
the immediate implementation of reciprocity, resulting benefits in terms of GDP and welfare, will be 
derived. Even though the trade balance continues to fall, other economic indicators remain positive for 
the region. Thus, the terms of trade, the trends which are negative under full reciprocity, become positive, 
in a scenario intensified regional integration. 
Figure 4: Effects of various scenarios on revenue-generating trade
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Source: ECA, GTAP V.5.4 simulations. 
S3- The sub-Saharan region, could derive most of its benefits, through the establishment a FTZ, with the 
European Union, under the terms of EPAs.. The GDP of Sub-Saharan Africa, could increase by a margin 
of 3.4 %, under a FTZ association with the EU. The terms of trade would also be more favourable.  
If general welfare and trade development, were to become more favourable, in an integrated sub-
Saharan setting, which implies immediate reciprocity within the framework of an EPA, it is evidently the 
establishment of a FTZ, that provides the greatest benefits to the region (over USD 8 billions). However, 
these gains, could only be realized, at the high cost of macroeconomic adjustments and particularly, in 
terms of the trade balance. 
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Figure 5: Effects on the trade balances and general welfare (USD billions)
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Source: Simulations ECA, GTAP V.5.4. 
Industrial structure in Sub-Saharan Africa: Options of EPAs 
The majority of African countries have put in place, structures aimed-at diversifying their economies. 
One of the reasons given, for the marginalisation of Africa in global trade, is the limitation of  its export 
diversification process.  Consequently, the impact of EPAs on the industrial structure of these counties, 
is significant. The Table in Annex-2, give some indications on the magnitude of those impacts, mostly 
derived from the implementation of reciprocal treatment in the industrial sectors of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Advanced regional integration would have the potential of providing a space, for the diversification 
in export production. The difference with scenario 1, in which Sub-Saharan African countries would 
specialise in the production of primary products, lies in the intensification of regional integration, 
enabling African countries, to produce value-added non-primary products.
The SSA region has the capacity of developing its export production capacity, in several industrial sectors. 
But it is in textiles and clothing, that  the development of regional exchanges, could prove  to be an 
important  lever for economic diversification in the Region. The expected growth rate in these sectors 
could be between  1.2% and 2.7%, as compared to the  market contractions, that they would experience 
under the first scenario. Another positive result, could be derived from several other primary production 
sectors( vegetables, oleaginous grains, cattle and animal products), which had total reciprocal negative 
growth, in other scenarios.. 
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Figures 6 and  7, indicate that even within the primary sectors, scenario-1 is unfavourable to Sub-Saharan 
countries, while in scenarios-2 and –3,  these sectors have a growth trend, with the exception of  natural 
resources’ mining activities.
Figure 6 : Production structure in Sub-Saharan African countries, with different EPA options
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Source: ECA Simulations, GTAP V.5.4.
Clearly, the majority of industries in Sub-Saharan Africa would experience a reduction in their production, 
under full reciprocity. This contraction would be more pronounced, in sectors that are generally 
considered, as the primary producers in the industrialisation process, namely low and intermediate 
technologies industrial sectors, the steel industry, and in textiles and clothing. With the exception of the 
cotton industry, energy production, mining of natural resources, fish catches and agro-industry, which 
could have a marginal expansion, the industrial sectors in the Sub-Saharan countries, would  contract 
significantly.
Hence, the risk of de-industrialisation, is a major factor to be considered during EPA negotiations, 
especially if the principle of reciprocity is applied. The only industrial sector likely to survive in such 
an environment, is the agro-industry, because there would be no changes in tariffs under the EPA 
arrangement. The impacts on the industrial structure, are amplified, in the event of a Free Trade Zone 
being established. De-industrialisation is clearly a risk even for low technology industries. However, 
within the context of a FTZ, agro-industry, textiles and clothing  would have discernible growth trends.
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Figure 7: The risk of de-industrialisation under the terms of EPAs 
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Source: Simulations ECA, GTAP V.5.4.
Demand and returns on  inputs
The three scenarios, have various levels of cost-adjustments, in terms of inputs. Figure-8 indicates that, 
in scenario-1, the demand for unskilled workers, is in sharp contrast in sectors, where value-added 
production takes place, such as cotton, fish catches, energy production, mining of natural resources and 
agro-industry. These contractions could prove very costly, since remuneration for workmanship, tends to 
be higher in the contracting sectors,  than in  the primary sectors.
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Figure 8 : Sectoral variations in the demand for unskilled labour 
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Table 2 : Income-generating factors in  Sub-Saharan Africa (variations in %)
Land
Intensified integration FTZs
.22 2.09
Skilled labour -0.29 -.92
Unskilled labour 0.9 .06
Capital 0. 6.0
Natural resources -0.96 -2.09
Source: ECA Simulations, GTAP V.5.4.
In addition to facilitating diversification in the industrial structure, intra-African integration  entails the 
increase of returns, on some essential inputs. Actual returns on land and capitalization, as well as skilled 
labour entitlements,  are positive. 
The results are similar, but more evident, in the case of a FTZ, between Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
EU. However, because of the availability of unskilled labourer in that region, remuneration costs are 
relatively low. In contrast to the cost of other inputs, with fixed costs, unskilled workers are presumed to 
be readily available, in to be in the sub-Saharan region. The decrease in terms of actual remuneration, is 
an indication of their availability, and therefore the basic rates would not rise as sharply, as that for other 
inputs. 
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Returns on inputs, as well as the overall economic performance in the Region, will have implications 
on general welfare. Consequently, the sub-Saharan countries would be disadvantaged in a scenario, 
which calls for full reciprocity, (scenario-1).In the two other scenarios (intensified integration and the 
establishment of a FTZ, respectively), SSA-countries could have some advantages. The following section 
analysis, those factors which are indicators of changes in general welfare, according to each of these three 
scenarios,  better illustrating possible implications of EPAs in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Sources of  the welfare variations: Analysis
On the aggregate, full reciprocity entails welfare loses for all regions, with the exception of the EU. Sub-
Saharan Africa would lose 564 million dollars. Table 3 shows the determinants of these welfare losses. 
The deterioration of  terms of trade that Sub-Saharan Africa is faced with explains more than a half of 
the welfare losses. In other terms, the incapacity of exports to pay  for the increase in imports induced by 
reciprocity will have the consequence of a11deterioration in the position of African countries within the 
context of an EPA with full reciprocity. In addition, the region will be faced with a welfare loss emanating 
from the deterioration in the investments-savings equilibrium. The only positive effect on welfare (45.7 
million USD)  results from a change in grants A free-trade zone between the European Union and sub-Saharan Africa 
is presented as an alternative scenario if the negotiations would thereafter aim at the establishment of an FTZ rather than what is 
currently perceived as the objective.. This is explained by the net increase in the demand for unskilled  labour.
The hindrances to intra-regional trade are imposing a substantial cost on the region. Their elimination in 
an EPA whose objectives will be to create competitiveness through major regional integration will bring 
to the region a major gain in welfare, which would rise to  1204 million USD.  This gain would mainly 
emanate from the reallocation of grants, better exchange rates in the region and removal of the distortions 
that today have the consequence of an inefficient allocation of grants.
11  A free-trade zone between the European Union and sub-Saharan Africa is presented as an alternative scenario if the negotiations 
would thereafter aim at the establishment of an FTZ rather than what is currently perceived as the objective.
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Table 3:  Sources of the variations in general welfare by region (million US$)
 
 Effects of Chg. Grants
Exchange 
rates Inv-Svings balance Total
Reciprocity . 0 2. -. .
EU Integration - 0 -6.9 0. -0.
FTZ 62.9 0 0.9 -6. 6.
Reciprocity . 0 -22.9 .9 -2.
CEEC Integration -. 0 -2. -. -.
FTZ . 0 -2.9 -. -.
Reciprocity -2 0 -9. 20.2 -.2
North America Integration -0.6 0 -6. -.2 -.2
FTZ -2.9 0 -60. -. -.9
Reciprocity -9.2 0 -2. 99.2 -.
Japan Integration -6. 0 - 2. -.2
FTZ -. 0 -6. 0. -.
Reciprocity -.6 . -2 -2. -6.9
Sub-Saharan Africa Integration 6.6 . . 6. 20.
FTZ .2 62 0. -6. 02.
Reciprocity -6. 0 -. 6. -.
China Integration -2 0 -. -0. -6.
FTZ -2. 0 -9.2 . -.2
Reciprocity -20. 0 - .2 -92.
RDM Integration -2. 0 6. -6.2 2.
FTZ -2.6 0 -620. . -.6
Source: ECA Simulations, GTAP V.5.4.
The analysis of the general equilibrium has permitted us to estimate the global impact of EPAs on 
the African continent under different scenarios. To complete this analysis, it is apt to now analyse the 
potential impact of these agreements on the COMESA countries. To do this, we shall utilise a partial 
equilibrium approach.
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IV.  Partial equilibrium analysis
4.1 The trade liberalisation scenario
The objective of this simulation of partial equilibrium is to evaluate, for each COMESA country, the effect 
of total liberalisation of its trade. The estimated amounts give us an idea of the magnitude of the direct 
effects, and that is without taking into account the sectoral interactions (feedback effects) of a reduction 
to zero of the duties  applied by the COMESA countries on imports emanating from the EU.
4.2 Trade creation and export diversion  to other export markets 
The effects of reciprocal preferential agreements between EU and COMESA countries, as illustrated in 
a partial equilibrium mode, are presented in Table- 5, the results of which indicate, as predicted, that in 
all the countries the creation of trade in favour of the EU should take place. As a whole, and also with all 
things being equal, the principle of reciprocity of EPAs should translate into an increase in trade. In no 
country is the diversion of trade of a higher scale  than the creation of trade, which signifies that the EPAs 
will have  positive commercial effects in each country. The creation of trade shown in table 5 is in favour 
of increased exports  from the EU to the COMESA countries. The creation of trade, taken in its classic 
acceptance, implies the supplanting of internal production within the COMESA countries.
Moreover, the trade diversion represents the level of trade that is diverted  from the rest of the world, 
particularly the COMESA countries, to the benefit of European producers. With equitable  conditions, 
the COMESA countries would produce more effectively this part of the diverted trade, but because of 
the  tariff reductions emanating from Europe, the most efficient producers of the EU are favoured in 
comparison to the most efficient producers from the rest of the world.
It is possible to interpret the results of Table-5, by taking the case of Burundi. If this country were to 
dismantle the tariff that it imposes on imports from 25 EU countries, that would imply a trade creation 
in favour of these  countries worth 12.4 million  dollars. This creation of trade would be to the profit of 
Burundian consumers, in the sense that more efficient EU producers would replace inefficient Burundian 
producers. This is considered as the harbinger of a raise in well-being since it improves the surplus of 
the consumer and generates  a net trade surplus of 1.6 million dollars. Of this figure, 17% corresponds 
to some of the trade that had beforehand concerned  COMESA the regional trade community  that 
Burundi belongs to. The dismantling of the trade tariffs in Burundi, well as it might permit the expansion 
of trade, potentially has two negative effects. To begin with, the diverted trade will result in the lowering 
of general welfare, elsewhere in the World, in the sense that that it came from more efficient non-
European producers initially. In addition, there will be significant losses within the  regional economic 
community.
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Increase in exports originating in the E U and passing through COMESA 
In total, the 25 EU countries could earn more than 1,152 million dollars through the increase in their 
exports to COMESA. countries..
Table 4 clearly shows that the main beneficiaries in Europe would be the United Kingdom (21.7% of 
the additional exports,  for a sum of 244.7 million dollars from the supplementary exports), followed by 
France(19%) Together, these two countries, plus Germany (15,6%), Italy (12,4%)  and Belgium (9,4%) 
could gain more than  72% of the increase  in exports to COMESA.
On the contrary, the ten countries that recently joined EU, such as Denmark, Portugal, Austria, Finland, 
Ireland and Luxemburg would obtain a very small potion from the increase in exports.
When we examine table 5, it emerges that the essential for the creation of trade in COMESA countries 
in favour of the EU will be found in Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia and Mauritius. In the case of Kenya and 
Mauritius, the effects of the  tariff falls and the volumes involved explain the impact observed. The major 
effects in Ethiopia are more due to the initial level of protectionism, which, once dismantled, would 
create major opportunities for the EU. It therefore appears clear that,  without taking into account the 
effects of the general equilibrium , the EPAs will be favourable for the development of trade, but at the 
expense of regional integration.
Table 4: Share of each EU country in additional exports to the COMESA sub-region
Exporters Additional X. (‘000$) % of total X 
United Kingdom 26,6 2,%
France 26,02 9,0%
Germany 609,0 ,6%
Italy 96, 2,%
Netherlands 0,6 ,%
Belgium 0606,0 9,%
Spain 00,02 ,%
Sweden 2209,62 2,0%
Total 2990,69 00,0%
Source:  Simulations of ECA, WITS-SMART.
Geographical distribution of EU surplus exports to COMESA 
It is equally possible to evaluate the respective share of each COMESA country, in the additional EU 
exports in the event of trade liberalisation. This simulation shows in which COMESA country, the EU 
countries had most benefits, accruing from the increase in exports . Figure-9 shows the respective share 
of COMESA countries, in the increase in exports from EU countries.. 
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Figure 9: Geographical distribution in the COMESA sub-region, of the increase in  European exports, 
after total liberalisation
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  Source: Simulations of ECA and WITS-SMART.
Kenya with 23% of the increase in trade with the EU occupies a dominant place. Mauritius, Sudan and 
Ethiopia follow, with an increase of  17,4, 12,6 et 12,5% respectively. 
Trade diversion as  detrimental to the COMESA countries
This section, analysis the probable impacts of the trade diversion, created by an EPA in the COMESA 
countries. It begins with a presentation of losses in intra-regional trade, followed by an attempt to identify 
the vulnerable products in the COMESA countries, and which must be carefully considered during the 
EPA negotiations. These products are those that would be the most affected by EU competition, and 
could be displaced from the COMESA markets altogether, by imports from the EU. A county-by-
country description of some  vulnerable products, is included in annex to this document.
Trade diversion, means the volume of export products, being diverted to other markets in the World, after trade 
liberalization comes into effect. EU products become better marketed and can therefore replace locally produced 
goods on the domestic markets or originating in other COMESA countries, or even from elsewhere in the world. 
The table below highlights the probable results of liberalization, and the diversion of trade from the 
COMESA markets, in the event of EPAs, and market flooding by imports from the EU. 
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Table 5:  Trade diversion from the COMESA markets, in the event of  EPAs
Country Trade Creation Net trade diversion 
Diversion of intra-
COMESA trade
Commercial gains 
for the EU
Burundi 226 -9062 -269 90
DRC 9 -690 -9 222926
Ethiopia 2066 -9 -260 0
Eritrea 09 - -26 
Djibouti 662 -966 -226 660209
Kenya 2299 -609 -2262 202
Madagascar 60 -06 -2092 20696
Malawi 200 -6 - 2669
Mauritius 669266 -999 -2602 2666
Rwanda 022 -0669 -920 6099
Seychelles 292 -22666 -9 20
Zimbabwe 606 -622 -2 626
Sudan 909 -9 -226 0
Uganda 96666 -906 -266 22
Zambia 60 -02 -02 2062
Total COMESA 90920 -226069 -0900 26
Source : Simulations of ECA and  CEA.
Estimated diversion of intra-regional trade, could reach USD 242 million, which is nearly a quarter of 
the total trade created in favour of the EU. Close to 5.8% of this diverted trade, involves intra-COMESA 
exchanges. It appears therefore, that full trade liberalization in the context of EPAs, would contravene 
regional integration, due to a major decrease in intra-regional trade (-5.8%). Comparatively speaking, 
this means that 10% of the diverted trade, would find its way to the ECOWAS region’, against 2% within 
the SADC  region ,and only 1% within the  ECCAS12 region. 
4.3  Impacts on revenues
The majority of COMESA countries, are to a large extent, dependent on customs duties for budgetary 
resources. This dependence, with relation to  tariff earnings, risk becoming a major constraint for the 
funding infrastructural development activities in cases where these fiscal earnings are concentrated on 
12  Voir Ben Hammouda, H., S. Karingi, R. Lang, N. Oulmane, R. Perez et M. Sadni-Jallab,  2005, “Economic and Welfare Impacts of the EU-
Africa Economic Partnership Agreements”, African Trade Policy Centre Paper, No. 10, Addis-Ababa
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imports from several countries. The EU is the major source of imports from the COMESA countries, and 
is consequently an essential component of the customs fiscal base. The elimination of tariffs on imports 
from the EU is therefore an important parameter for the analysis of EPA. Table 6 reveals the probable 
losses of  fiscal revenues suffered by each COMESA country due to the reciprocal preferential agreements 
with the EU. The results indicate the value of tariff earnings that the countries of ASE must truly lose 
because of these agreements.
In terms of their absolute value, the countries that will be affected the most by the elimination of tariff 
barriers to imports from Europe, are Kenya, Sudan, Mauritius, Ethiopia, DRC and  Seychelles. The 
loss of revenue in itself represents a major challenge that the country will have to resolve to be able to 
give reciprocal preferences to the EU. In a certain number of these countries, dependence on customs 
duties results both from slow development of fiscal administration, but also on the consideration of 
industrial policy. Regarding the issues of weak fiscal development, it should be underscored that most of 
the COMESA countries will have problems compensating rapidly for the loss of revenue induced by the 
EPA countries.
Table 6: Revenue implications in the COMESA sub-region (USD)
Country Revenue shortfalls
Burundi -,66,9.00
DRC -2,69,2.00
Ethiopia -,26,9.00
Eritrea -,,20.00
Djibouti -,2,2.00
Kenya -0,2,2.00
Madagascar -,,90.00
Malawi -,090,0.00
Mauritius -,,96.00
Rwanda -,622,96.00
Seychelles -2,9,.00
Zimbabwe -,0,90.00
Sudan -,9,6.00
Uganda -9,,0.00
Zambia -,,.00
Source: Simulation of ACE-WITS/SMART. 
4.4  Implications on the welfare, in the event  of EPAs  
Market liberalisation, generally has positive effects in the overall wellbeing of populations. However, 
evaluating the conditions of general welfare, after trade liberalization, is a daunting task. There are 
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nevertheless, some empirical works, on various methods of calculating these effects, in spite of their 
complexity. Variations of welfare conditions, are proportional to the variation in fiscal revenue, as analysed 
below, by taking the consumer surplus over the production surplus. 
Table 7: Implications on welfare ( consumer market surplus), in the event of EPAs (USD)
Country Consumer market surplus
Burundi ,2,90.00
DRC ,2,6.00
Ethiopia 9,029,.00
Eritrea ,,2.00
Djibouti 0,9,90.00
Kenya 0,6,6.00
Madagascar 6,9.00
Malawi 2,0,9.00
Mauritius ,0,2.00
Rwanda ,92.00
Seychelles ,06,2.00
Zimbabwe ,90,.00
Sudan 9,,90.00
Uganda ,66,690.00
Zambia ,9,9.00
Source: Simulations of the ECA-WITS/SMART. 
Consumers in the COMESA sub-region, would benefit from the principle of reciprocity, called-for 
by EPAs. However this assessment of the implications on welfare, by-passes losses incurred by local 
producers, in the event of a market surplus, or due to the ejectment of local producers from domestic 
markets, in favour of EU producers, in the wake of the sudden increase in European exports.
The probable benefits, derived from EPAs, in general welfare, depend to a large extent, on trade creation 
of competitive markets for consumer-goods. It is therefore not surprising that it is in countries such 
as Mauritius, or Kenya that most of these advantages will be felt, because these countries enjoy very 
strong trade relations and in fine, the consumers would gain significantly from  EPAs with the EU. 
Hence, in terms of trade creation, and positive  implications on welfare, the EPAs would be potentially 
beneficial for COMESA countries. However, these results are static and do not take into account the loss 
of the producer surplus with regard to which we can without any doubt agree on the extent to which 
firms established in the COMESA region but which will not be competitive with regard to European 
firms, shall be obliged to make losses. In addition, analysis on partial equilibrium ignore changes in the 
economic structure which in a dynamic perspective will tend to temper the potentially beneficial effects 
indicated in this analysis.
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Conclusion 
The purpose of this study is to assess, inasmuch as possible, the impacts of  Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs), between the COMESA countries and those European Union (EU), on multilateral 
trade development. Two complementary methodologies were used in this analysis: The first, is based on 
a general equilibrium approach, which is an appropriate tool to evaluate the theoretical aspect of this 
type of agreement, while the second, is based on a  partial equilibrium model, used in this case, because 
relevant data on the economic situation in the COMESA sub-region, are scanty. The partial equilibrium 
model , also has the advantage as it is in most Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, and also has the 
advantage of using data bases, which are not as specialized as that, otherwise needed in the general 
equilibrium model. 
It is our considered opinion, that the concept of EPAs, offers sustainable options for trade liberalization 
in the SSA region. We have tested three different scenarios, based-on the general equilibrium approach. 
According to the results obtained, indicate that the first implications of relevance, which will have to be 
negotiated with the EU, relates to the issue of preferential treatment in tariff reduction and elimination, 
to be granted on a reciprocal basis, EU countries, and aligned with those tariffs, currently being applied 
on African exports to EU markets. In a second scenario, we analyzed the impact of accelerated regional 
integration, without immediate application of reciprocal treatment, but with preferential tariffs, being 
applied to imports, originating in the EU countries, In this scenario, the COMESA countries, would have 
to liberalize their markets, initially to intra-regional trade, but without immediate reciprocal treatment of 
EU imports. In a third scenario, we explored the options of creating a Free Trade Zone (FTZ), between 
the ACP and the EU countries.
Several lessons, can be learnt from this study. First of all, that African countries are heavily dependent 
on trade revenues, for their infrastructural development, and would therefore be highly vulnerable to 
external economic pressure, in the form of tariff reduction, or elimination. While considering the level of 
protectionism in the SSA countries, with respect to EU products, it was noticed that, basically, only food-
processing and light industries, are strongly protected, in the Region, and which can serve as indicators 
of domestic industrial policies. Another interpretation of this high level of tariffs, imposed on European 
imports, is to consider them as a source of revenue.
At the level of intra-African trade, the significance of trade barriers, must be taken into account. As a 
result, intensified regional integration, there are growing fears related to loss of customs revenue, on one 
hand, and on the other, there is the real intra-Africa development potential through trade creation and 
economic diversification, once the trade barriers have been eliminated. 
Results from simulations in the different scenarios, also confirm that the first one (S-1), would be 
unfavourable to Sub-Saharan Africa, because full reciprocity would impact negatively on the Sub-Saharan 
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African economies,  both in terms of GDP, the trade balance. Trade relations and general welfare, would 
however, register positive trends, in contrast with the industrial sector, which is clearly impacted by a 
decrease in production levels, full reciprocity. The risk of de-industrialization, is therefore high, whenever 
the principle of reciprocity is fully applied. 
The second scenario had positive results, in terms of GDP and general welfare. The terms of trade, also 
improve, but trade balances regress. Finally, in the third scenario, which is the boldest, inasmuch it takes 
into account, the dismantling of most trade barriers, in the EU markets, which would entail the highest 
gains possible, for the SSA countries (over USD 8 billion, in terms of improved general welfare).
However, these benefits can only be realized, at the cost of significant and extensive macro-economic 
adjustments. Indeed, the tools used to assess the impacts of EPAs in the three scenarios, did not take into 
account the cost of structural adjustments related to this widespread liberalization of SSA markets. These 
costs are all the more significant, as trade liberalization  arrangements become expansive, and would 
entail reallocation of various economic factors, generated on the liberalized markets. The time-frame 
for  implementation of agreements, such as EPAs, is therefore critical for African countries, because it 
must coincide with their ability to bear the costs of structural adjustments, growing-out of a market 
liberalization arrangement. 
In order to have an idea of the magnitude of variations involved in the main aggregates of total trade 
liberalization processes, for each COMESA country, we used the partial equilibrium method, to evaluate 
the consequences of the elimination of customs duties, on imports from the EU. This simulation gives 
us thus, an idea of the magnitude of those adjustments, which the COMESA countries would have to 
make, in dismantling  their trade barriers. 
These countries would have to undergo serious losses in customs’ revenue, on EU imports. Inevitably, a 
considerable portion of these imports, would be diverted from the COMESA markets, to the detriment 
of their other partners, and often to that of other COMESA Members. This phenomenon augur well for 
greater regional integration.
Finally, the positive effects of EPAs, which would benefit the consumers in COMESA countries, would 
have to be weighed against these probable losses in revenue, in private sector enterprises, crowded-out 
of local markets by more competitive European producers, besides the significant losses due to de-
industrialization.. Since these losses are not easily recovered, and adjustments cannot be carried out 
instantaneously, concrete measures must be taken to ensure fiscal sustainability, as crucial to any Nation 
State..
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Annex 1
The WITS/SMART model  
This study uses the framework of the WITS/SMART partial equilibrium model. The WITS (World 
Integrated Trade Solution) solution brings together various databases (bilateral trade, commercial flows 
of products, various levels and types of protection). WITS also integrates analytical tools. The SMART 
simulation model is one of the analytical tools of WITS. SMART contains analytical modules, which 
allow the analysis of trade policy such as the effects of multilateral tariff reductions, of preferential trade 
liberalization or of unilateral tariff changes. The fundamental theory, which underlies this analytical tool, 
is the partial equilibrium standard framework, which considers constant dynamic effects. Like any partial 
equilibrium model, it has this strong constraint, which at the same time makes possible the analysis of 
trade policy to be undertaken only for one country. In spite of this weakness, WITS/SMART can help 
to estimate the creation and trade diversion, welfare and the effects on the tariff revenue for the countries 
whose data are available. 
Trade creation 
The theory underlying WITS/SMART is presented in detail in Laird and Yeats (1986). The trade creation 
represents the extension of trade resulting from liberalization and linked to the displacement of the 
inefficient producers in a given preferential trade area (a free-trade area, for example). It is assumed that 
there is full transmission of price changes when the tariff or non-tariff barriers (ad valorem equivalents) 
is reduced or eliminated. Laird and Yeats (1986) derive the equation, which can be used to estimate the 
effects of trade creation. 
Given a basic trade model, made up of simplified functions for demand for imports and supply of exports 
and of identity allowing equilibrium:  
The import demand function for country j   from country k for good i is written: 
),,( ikijjijk PPYfM =        () 
The export supply function of good i   from country k   is written: 
)( ikjijk PfX =         (2) 
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The trade balance between the two countries is the standard equation of partial equilibrium: 
ikjijk XM =         (3) 
In an environment of free trade, the domestic price 13  of product  i   in country  j   coming from the 
country  k   should vary with the variation of the customs tariff as follows: 
)( ijkikjijk tPP +=        (4) 
To obtain the trade creation formula, Laird and Yeats (1986) differentiate price equation (4): 
         (5) 
Equations (4) and (5) are then substituted in the elasticity14 of the import demand equation to obtain:    
         (6) 
From the identity in equation (3), 
                           
one can obtain the following expression for the 
elasticity of demand for exports: 
    which, once used in equation 6, makes possible the calculation of the effect of  
  trade creation, which from equation (3) is equivalent to the growth of exports  
  from country k of product i to country j:
         (7) 
If ∞→eiγ , then equation (7) can be simplified as follows: 
         (8) 
13  Insurance and transport costs are not explicitly reflected in the equation.
14  The elasticity of import demand is 
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where  TCijk   is the sum of the trade created, in millions dollars, for products  i   affected by the change 
of tariff and  miη   is the elasticity of the import demand for product  i   in the importing country.  Mijk  
is the current level of the import demand for a given product i.  0ijkt and  

ijkt  respectively represent the 
tariff rates for product i at the initial   and final period. Trade creation then depends on the current level 
of imports, on the elasticity of import demand for and the relative change of tariffs. 
Trade diversion 
Trade diversion, as opposed to trade creation, can increase or reduce the total amount of trade. Trade 
diversion is a phenomenon which occurs, for example, in a free-trade zone where efficient producers 
from outside the free-trade zone are replaced by less efficient producers in the preferential area. If one 
considers an EPA between ECOWAS and the European Union, for example, trade diversion would 
appear if, because of the EPA, more efficient suppliers from the rest of the world (ROW) are replaced by 
less efficient European producers. If we assume the conclusion of an EPA which leads to the reduction of 
tariffs vis-à-vis the European Union without any change of the tariffs concerning the products of the rest 
of the world, the theory that underlies SMART makes it possible to apprehend trade diversion.  
First, the expression of elasticity of substitution is given. Elasticity of substitution can be expressed as the 
variation of the percentage of the relative shares of imports from two different sources, due to a change 
of one per cent of the relative prices of the same product from these two sources: 
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where  k  concerns imports from the European Union and  K   concerns the imports coming from the 
rest of the world. Equation (9) can be transformed to obtain the expression for trade diversion, which is 
written: 
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Equation (10) can be simplified in the case of an EPA. As Laird and Yeat note, the relative price variations 
in the equation are linked to the changes of tariffs or the ad valorem equivalent of the non-tariff barriers 
for the European Union and ROW. Consequently, the trade diverted in favour of the European Union, 
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denoted,                     can be apprehended by rewriting equation (10) above as follows: 
                                                                   () 
and  ROWM  are the current imports, for a given region, respectively coming from the European Union 
and rest of the world.  
0
EUt     and          are respectively the customs duties imposed on European products 
at the end and at the beginning of the period with.                 The term Mσ  represents the elasticity of 
substitution between imports coming from the European Union and those coming from the rest of the 
world, in the given region. Trade diversion then depends:  
on the current level of imports coming from the European Union and the rest of the world; of the 
percentage of variation (reduction in this case) of the tariffs applied to imports from the European Union 
with unchanged tariffs for products coming from the rest of the world; 
and on the elasticity of the substitution of the imports between the two sources. The higher the value of 
the elasticity of substitution is, the greater will be trade diversion. 
Effect on trade 
The overall effect on trade can be obtained by adding up trade creation and trade diversion. As indicated 
by Laird and Yeats (1986), the adding up of equations (8) and (10) for a country can be made through 
the products and/or sources. It is also possible to carry out the summation for a group of importers for a 
product or a group of products as well as for only one source of supply or a group of suppliers. 
Effect on revenue
The quantification of the effect on revenue using the WITS/SMART model is relatively easy. Theoretically, 
tariff revenue is given as the product of the tax rate (tariff rate in this case) and of the tax base (the value 
of imports). Thus, before the variation of the ad valorem equivalent of barriers to trade (tariff and non-
tariff), the tariff revenue is written: 
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After the variation of the tariffs, the new tariff revenue is written: 
 ∑∑=
i k
ijkijkijk MPtR


The loss of revenue resulting from the implementation of an EPA corresponds to the difference between 
the two values  R1   and  R0  and which is written: 
∑∑=
i k
ijkijkijk MPtR

         (2) 
Effect on welfare 
As with the effect on tariff revenue, the assessment of the effect on welfare is easy. It is the difference of 
equivalent variations in the general equilibrium. Essentially, the effect on welfare is mainly attributed to 
the benefits of lower import prices that the consumer draws in the importing country15. The consumer 
will substitute cheaper imported products to more expensive domestic or imported products because they 
are affected by the tariff reduction. Increases in imports entail a net gain of welfare for the consumer and 
is measured as follows: 
)(5.0 ijkijkijk Mtw ∆∆=        (3) 
Coefficient 0.5 gives the average between the effect of barriers to trade before and after their elimination/
reduction. Equation (13) assumes that the elasticity of supply on exportation is infinite. If this is not the 
case, import prices in the importing countries will drop less than proportionally to the fall in the tariff 
barriers. Consequently, while the equation can be used to measure the effect on welfare, it is no longer 
only a representation of the consumer’s surplus but integrates some element of the producer’s surplus (see 
Laird and Yeats 1986). 
The WITS database  
The WITS database comes from various sources. The principal ones are the COMTRADE and TRAINS 
bases. It is complemented by data from EUROSTAT and as far as possible by national data. 
15  As Laird and Yeats (1986) emphasize, in the case of a preexistent level of imports, there is no net gain in terms of welfare. In fact, the tariff 
reduction entails simply a reallocation/transfer of government revenue to the consumers.
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Table 8: Aggregation of regions (GTAP version 5) 
Code  Aggregated 
regions 
GTAP regions
. EU6 European Union Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, United 
Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Hungary, Poland, Rest of the Association of Central 
Europe 
2. BWA Botswana Botswana 
. XSC Remain SACU Namibia and South Africa 
. MOZ Mozambique Mozambique 
. MWI Malawi Malawi 
6. TZA Tanzania Tanzania 
. ZMB Zambia Zambia 
. ZWE Zimbabwe Zimbabwe 
9. UGA Uganda Uganda 
0. XSF Rest of Southern 
Africa 
Other Southern Africa (Angola) 
. XSS Rest of Sub-
Saharan Africa 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, including the countries of CEMAC 
2. ROW Other regions Australia, New Zealand, China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, 
Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Rest of South Asia, Canada, the 
United States, Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, Colombia, 
Peru, Venezuela, Rest of the Andean Pact, Argentine, Brazil, Chile, 
Uruguay and Rest of South America, Switzerland, Rest of EFTA, 
Former Soviet Union, Turkey, Rest of the Middle-East, Morocco, Rest 
of North Africa, Rest of the world 
16  In Version 5 of the GTAP database, the countries acceding the European Union are treated either individually (Poland and Hungary) 
or as members of the aggregate “Association of Central Europe”. In this study, the European Union thus comprises the old European 
Union at 15 plus the 10 new members. 
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Table 9: Sectoral aggregation (GTAP version 5) 
Code Aggregated sectors GTAP sectors 
. Cereals Grains Raw rice, wheat, cereals and nca grains 
2. Vegetables Fruit and vegetables Vegetables, fruits, nuts,  
. Oilseeds Oleaginous seeds Oleaginous seeds,  
. Sugar Sugar Sugar cane, beet sugar, 
. Cotton Cotton Fibers 
6. oCrops Other harvests Nca harvests 
. Livestock Animals and animal 
products 
Cattle, sheep, goat milk cheese, horses, nca 
animals, vitamin-enriched milk, wool, silkworm 
cocoons 
. Natural resources Forestry, Fishing, Coal, Oil, Gas, nca ores 
9. Agroproc Food-processing 
industries 
Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horse; nca meat 
products, vegetable oil and fats, dairy products, 
treated rice, sugar, nca foodstuffs, Drinks and 
tobacco products  
0. Lightmanuf Light industries Textiles, clothing, leather products, wood 
products, paper products, publishing 
. Industry Industrial sectors Petroleum, coal products, nca mineral products, 
chemical products, rubber, plastic products, 
ferrous metals, nca metals, metal products, 
Motor vehicles and spare parts, transport 
facilities nca, Electronic appliances, Machinery 
and nca equipment, nca manufactured products 
2. Services Services of Utility Electricity, manufacture and gas distribution, 
water, construction, communication, nca 
financial services, insurance services, leisure 
and other services, residences, Public admin. 
/Defense/Health/Education 
. Trade Facilitation of the trade Trade, maritime transport, air transport 
Source: GTAP Version 5 database aggregations.
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Annex 2 
Table 10:   Impacts of different scenarios on the main aggregates  (general equilibrium simulations) 
Table C Variation as % Millions of $ 
GDP Imports Real exchange rate Trade balance Balance of trade 
Scenario : Full reciprocity 
EU 0.00 0.09 0.0 0.06 2.2 .09 
CEEC 0.009 -0.0 0.02 -0.00 2.6 -2. 
North America -0.000 -0.0 0.020 -0.00 29.92 -.62 
Japan -0.000 -0.0 0.09 -0.02 66.69 -.02 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.029 . 2.2 -0. -6.6 -6.9 
China -0.00 -0.06 -0.0 -0.022 . -.0 
Rest of the World -0.00 -0.06 -0.006 0.60 -92.96 
Scenario 2: Intensified Sub-Saharan African integration without reciprocity 
UE -0.000 -0.002 0.00 -0.00 9.666 -0.622 
CEEC -0.000 -0.00 0.009 -0.00 .0 -.0 
North America 0 -0.00 0.0092 -0.002 0.2 -.692 
Japan -0.000 -0.006 0.06 -0.00 9.902 -.62 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.96 2.2 .2906 0.2996 -629.6 20.26 
China -0.0002 -0.0 0.006 -0.006 .2 -6.9 
Rest of the world -0.0002 -0.00 0.00 0.002 6.0926 2. 
Scenario :Free-trade zone 
EU 0.009 0.22 0.2 0.09 9.9 6. 
CEEC 0.000 -0.0696 0.2 -0.029 69.020 -. 
North America -0.000 -0.00 0.0 -0.09 .6 -.900 
Japan -0.00 -0.6 0.9 -0.069 92.62 -.06 
Sub-Saharan Africa .90 .2 .6 -.299 02.66 
China -0.002 -0.26 0.00 -0.0 .9 -.0 
Rest of the world -0.000 -0.20 0.002 -0.02 0.096 -.6 
Source: ECA, GTAP V.5.4 simulations.
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Annex 3
Table 11: Production variations  in sub-Saharan Africa (variation as %) 
Full reciprocity Full integration Free-trade zone 
Cereals 0.02 0. . 
Vegetables -0.206 0.26 . 
Oleaginous seeds -0.099 0.2 .02 
Sugar 0.02 0.69 2.9 
Cotton 0.6 -0.029 -.29 
Harvests 0.0 -0.066 0.90 
Livestock -0.2 0.6 .269 
Animal products -0.09 0.06 .962 
Fish -0. 0.262 .62 
Energy 0. -0.29 -.929 
Natural resources 0.22 -0. -. 
Food-processing industries 0.0 0.6 2.2 
Textiles -0.699 . 2.0 
Clothing -2.669 2.9 9.2 
Low-technology industries -. .2 -.02 
Average-technology industries -.06 .026 -2.996 
Heavy industries -.26 .296 -0.966 
Source: ECA, GTAP V.5.4 simulations.
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Annex 4
Results of partial equilibrium simulations per country (COMESA) 
Burundi (USD ‘000) 
Table 12: Trade diversion in Burundi 
Exporter to Burundi Export 
Total COMESA -229.66 
Kenya -20.6 
Uganda -69. 
Zambia -2.9 
Mauritius -0.6 
Zimbabwe -. 
Rwanda -.9 
Total Rest of Africa -229.06 
South Africa -9. 
Tanzania -9.6 
Total Rest of the World -2.09 
Table 13: Trade diversion in Djibouti (USD ‘000) 
Exporter to Djibouti Export 
Total COMESA -2. 
Kenya -0.02 
Egypt, -.6 
Ethiopia (less Eritrea) -29.0 
Mauritius -0.26 
Uganda -0.6 
Madagascar -0.2 
Total Rest of Africa -. 
South Africa -.62 
Tunisia -9.0 
Swaziland -.902 
Morocco -.2 
Senegal -.2 
Benin -0.692 
Tanzania -0.2 
Togo -0.0 
Total Remains World -9.9 
Source: WITS-SMART, ECA simulations.
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Table 14: Trade diversion in Ethiopia (USD ‘000) 
Exporter to Ethiopia Export 
Total COMESA - 2.6 
Djibouti -2 .0 
Kenya -9.229 
Egypt -0. 
Sudan -22.2 
Zimbabwe -9.6 
Madagascar -. 
Uganda -.6 
Zambia -.6 
Rwanda -2.6 
Malawi -0.90 
Somalia -0.0 
Total Reset of Africa - .6 
South Africa -2.9 
Swaziland -.09 
Niger -0. 
Senegal -.6 
Tunisia -2.29 
Nigeria -2. 
Mauritania -.96 
Algeria -.002 
Namibia -.09 
Angola -.9 
Tanzania -2.66 
Gambia -.2 
Gabon -.09 
Total Rest of the World -20 .6 
Table 15: Trade diversion in Eritrea (USD ‘000) 
Exporter to Eritrea Export 
Total COMESA -26. 
Kenya -22.2 
Uganda -.06 
Sudan -0.992 
Zimbabwe -0.9 
Total Rest of Africa -9. 
South Africa -6. 
Tunisia -2.6 
Morocco -0.6 
Total Rest of the World -2.9 
Source: WITS-SMART, ECA. 
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Table 16: Trade diversion in Malawi (USD ‘000) 
Exporter to Malawi Export 
Total COMESA -. 
Zimbabwe -2.00 
Kenya -62.6 
Zambia -. 
Uganda -.262 
Mauritius -2. 
Egypt -.62 
Madagascar -0.0 
Ethiopia (less Eritrea -0. 
Total Rest of Africa -00.02 
South Africa - 9.6 
Mozambique -9.09 
Tanzania -.0 
Botswana -.66 
Swaziland -.0 
Senegal -. 
Nigeria -. 
Namibia -.2 
Niger -.6 
Total Rest of the World -2.6 
Source: WITS-SMART, ECA simulations.
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Table 17: Trade diversion in Zimbabwe (USD ‘000) 
Exporter to Zimbabwe Export 
Total COMESA -2. 
Zambia -0.26 
Mauritius -.06 
Kenya -.9 
Egypt -0.66 
Malawi -2. 
Seychelles -0. 
Sudan -0.0 
Uganda -0.22 
Congo, Dem. Reference mark. -0.6 
Ethiopia (less Eritrea) -0.066 
Total Rest of Africa -9.2 
South Africa - 0. 
Botswana -20.99 
Swaziland -.9 
Mozambique -9.2 
Nigeria -. 
Ghana -.2 
Mali -.09 
Senegal -2. 
Tanzania -2.6 
Namibia -2.0 
Morocco -. 
Niger -. 
Gabon -. 
Total Rest of the World -629.9 
Source: WITS-SMART, ECA simulations. 
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Table 18: Trade diversion in Zambia (USD ‘000) 
Exporter to Zambia Export 
Total COMESA -.0 
Zimbabwe -29.6 
Kenya -6.0 
Malawi -2.69 
Mauritius -22. 
Egypt. -6.0 
Democratic Republic of Congo -.02 
Ethiopia (less Eritrea) -2.9 
Uganda -0.9 
Sudan -0.22 
Rwanda -0.0 
Madagascar -0.0 
Eritrea -0.02 
Burundi -0.09 
Total Rest of Africa -6. 
South Africa -6 .2 
Tanzania -.99 
Botswana -0.2 
Swaziland -6.6 
Mozambique -.0 
Namibia -.20 
Lesotho -.9 
Nigeria -.2 
Tunisia -2.9 
Niger -2.9 
Gambia -. 
Total Rest of the World -0.2 
Source: WITS-SMART, ECA simulations. 
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Table 19: Trade diversion in Uganda (USD ‘000) 
Exporter to Uganda Export 
Total COMESA -26.6 
Kenya -9.099 
Egypt -9.9 
Mauritius -. 
Zimbabwe -0.20 
Malawi -. 
Ethiopia (less Eritrea) -. 
Eritrea -.0 
Democratic Rep. of Congo -2.9 
Zambia -. 
Rwanda -.292 
Sudan -0.2 
Madagascar -0. 
Djibouti -0.00 
Total Reset of Africa -9. 
South Africa - 06.2 
Tanzania -2.2 
Swaziland -6. 
Nigeria -.2 
Namibia -6.6 
Botswana -.09 
Morocco -.9 
Niger -.0 
Mali -.06 
Ghana -2.66 
Côte d’Ivoire -2.9 
Cameroon -2. 
Republic of Congo -.02 
Mozambique -.6 
Total Rest of the World -66. 
Source: WITS-SMART, ECA simulations.
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Table 20: Trade diversion in Sudan (USD ‘000) 
Exporter to Sudan Export  
Total COMESA  22.6 
Kenya - 6. 
Uganda -6. 
Mauritius -0.206 
Total Rest of Africa -. 
South Africa -0.06 
Tunisia -66.06 
Morocco -2.96 
Total Rest of the World - 9.0 
Source: WITS-SMART, ECA simulations 
Table 21: Trade diversion in Seychelles (USD ‘000) 
Exporter to Seychelles Export 
Total COMESA -.9 
Mauritius -.606 
Kenya -6.2 
Madagascar -.99 
Zambia -.06 
Zimbabwe -0.6 
Egypt -0.26 
Total Rest of Africa -90. 
South Africa -.0 
Swaziland -.6 
Total reset of the World -6.0 
Source:   WITS-SMART, ECA Simulations.
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Table 22: Trade diversion in Rwanda (USD ‘000) 
Exporter to Rwanda Export 
Total COMESA -9.2 
Kenya -. 
Uganda -209.00 
Egypt -6.29 
Democratic Republic of Congo -.9 
Burundi -.0 
Zimbabwe -2.92 
Zambia -2.09 
Ethiopia (less Eritrea) -2.26 
Mauritius -. 
Madagascar -0. 
Sudan -0.02 
Total Rest of Africa -.2 
South Africa -.2 
Tanzania -2.0 
Swaziland -.06 
Cameroon -.069 
Mozambique -.929 
Nigeria -. 
Gabon -2.2 
Senegal -2.2 
Guinea -2.26 
Republic of Congo -. 
Mali -.099 
Total Rest of the World -0. 
Source: Simulations, Wits-smart, ECA. 
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Table 23: Trade diversion in Mauritius (USD ‘000) 
Exporter to Mauritius Export 
Total COMESA -2 6.0 
Egypt -2 9. 
Madagascar -26.9 
Zimbabwe -6.6 
Kenya -9.0 
Seychelles -2.9 
Total Rest of Africa -0222.0 
South Africa -9 6.9 
Swaziland -.266 
Morocco -. 
Namibia -0. 
Tanzania -.6 
Mozambique -.6 
Tunisia -.2 
Botswana -2. 
Nigeria -2.20 
Sierra Leone -.22 
Total Rest of the World -6.0 
Source: WITS-SMART, ECA simulations.
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Table 24: Trade diversion in Madagascar ($USD 000) 
Exporter to Madagascar Export 
Total COMESA -2.092 
Mauritius -29. 
Egypt. -.6 
Kenya -.96 
Zimbabwe -0.6 
Uganda -0.26 
Seychelles -0.222 
Rwanda -0.02 
Zambia -0.02 
Burundi -0.00 
Democratic Rep. of Congo -0.00 
Djibouti -0.00 
Ethiopia (less Eritrea) -0.002 
Total Rest of Africa -6.92 
South Africa -2.2 
Swaziland -9.2 
Morocco -. 
Tunisia -2. 
Côte d’Ivoire -.00 
Senegal -2.6 
Tanzania -.92 
Nigeria -.0 
Total Rest of the World -2. 
Source: WITS-SMART, ECA simulations. 
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Table 25: Trade diversion in Kenya (USD ‘000) 
Exporter to Kenya Export 
Total COMESA -2 26. 
Egypt - 9.2 
Zimbabwe -0.6 
Uganda -2.62 
Zambia -.0 
Seychelles -2.6 
Sudan -2. 
Malawi -2.969 
Ethiopia (less Eritrea) -2.2 
Rwanda -9. 
Madagascar -.0 
Eritrea -.9 
Burundi -0.9 
Djibouti -0.09 
Total Rest of Africa -0 .2 
South Africa -9 26. 
Mauritania -6.69 
Tanzania -2.9 
Swaziland -2.29 
Namibia -.9 
Nigeria -29.0 
Mozambique -2.6 
Senegal -2.2 
Morocco -2.2 
Guinea -.2 
Republic of Congo -.66 
Gambia -.66 
Niger -2.2 
Sierra Leone -.6 
Ghana -.02 
Botswana -2. 
Somalia -. 
Mali -.9 
Cameroon -. 
Guyana -.0 
Total Rest of the World - 2. 
Source: WITS-SMART, ECA simulations. 
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Table 26:  Trade diversion in the Democratic Republic of Congo (USD ‘000)
Exports to the Dem. Rep. of Congo Export
Total COMESA -.9
Uganda -.9
Total Rest of Africa - .00
South Africa - .00
Total Rest of the World -2.2
Source:  WITS-SMART, ECA simulations
